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The Economic transmission of fiscal policy shocks  




This paper studies the transmission of a foreign fiscal policy shock (assumed to be generated in Germany) to 
key macroeconomic variables in five Central and Eastern European economies (CEE-5). We use quarterly 
data from 1995 to 2009 and estimate an open economy structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model 
identified by imposing reasonable restrictions on contemporaneous responses in the system. Our model is 
able to identify well-known episodes of fiscal policy action in the countries under review. We find that a 
foreign fiscal shock affects domestic fiscal variables and vice versa, highlighting the importance of cross-
country coordination of fiscal policies within the EU. All the CEE-5 respond to a fiscal expansion abroad 
with fiscal easing at home (more strongly on the public spending than on the revenue side). We find negative 
cross-border fiscal spillovers for Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while in Poland and Hungary, 
output reacts positively to a fiscal expansion in Germany. For domestic fiscal shocks, which we also explore, 
we find Keynesian responses in Hungary and Slovakia, while non-Keynesian responses are present in the 
Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia. Our results imply that “one-size-fits-all” policy recommendations 
would be too simplistic for the CEE-5;  a deeper understanding of the reasons for cross-country differences 
in response to fiscal shocks is required to be able to provide adequate information to policymakers in these 
countries. 
 
JEL classification: C54, E62, H2, H5, P2 
Keywords: fiscal policy, cross-border spillovers, fiscal multiplier, foreign shock, structural vector 
autoregression, Central and Eastern Europe, Germany 
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The Economic transmission of fiscal policy shocks  





Tutkimuksessa analysoidaan oletuksen mukaan Saksan taloudesta tulevan ulkomaisen finanssipolitiikkasokin 
välittymistä makrotaloudellisiin muuttujiin keskisen Itä-Euroopan maissa (ns. CEE-5). Tutkimuksessa käyte-
tään neljännesvuosiaineistoa vuosilta 1995–2009 ja estimoidaan avotalouden rakenteellinen vektoriautore-
gressiivinen malli, joka identifioidaan käyttäen rajoitteita sokkien samanhetkisistä vaikutuksista. Malli kyke-
nee tunnistamaan yleisesti tiedettyjä finanssipoliittisia toimenpiteitä tutkittavissa maissa. Tulosten mukaan 
ulkomainen finanssipoliittinen sokki vaikuttaa kotimaisiin finanssipoliittisiin muuttujiin ja päinvastoin, mikä 
korostaa maiden välisen finanssipoliittisen koordinaation tarvetta EU:ssa. Kaikki CEE-5 maat reagoivat ul-
komaiseen finanssipoliittiseen ekspansioon keventämällä kotimaista finanssipolitiikkaa (vahvemmin julkisen 
kulutuksen kuin tulojen kautta). Tutkimuksessa ulkomaisella sokilla havaitaan olevan maiden rajat ylittäviä 
negatiivisia spillover-vaikutuksia Slovakiassa, Sloveniassa ja Tšekin tasavallassa, kun taas Puolassa ja Unka-
rissa tuotanto reagoi positiivisesti Saksan finanssipoliittiseen ekspansioon. Kotimaisella finanssipoliittisella 
sokilla on keynesiläisiä vaikutuksia Slovakissa ja Unkarissa, kun taas ei-keynesiläisiä vaikutuksia havaitaan 
Puolassa, Sloveniassa ja Tšekin tasavallassa. Tulosten mukaan nk. one-size-fits-all poliittiset suositukset ovat 
liian yksinkertaisia CEE-5 maiden ollessa kyseessä. Syvällinen ymmärrys maiden toisistaan eroavista reakti-
oista finanssipoliittisiin sokkeihin on tarpeen, jotta päätöksentekijöille näissä maissa voidaan antaa riittävä 
informaatio.  
 
JEL-luokitus: C54, E62, H2, H5, P2 
Asiasanat:  finanssipolitiikka,  maiden  väliset  spillover-vaikutukset,  finanssipolitiikan  kerroin,  ulkomainen 
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1  Introduction  
 
The 2008−09 “Great Recession” has sparked renewed interest in fiscal policy. The extraordinary 
intensity of the downturn forced the implementation of sizeable fiscal stimulus packages at the 
beginning of the crisis. Headline fiscal positions strongly deteriorated (not only due to discretionary 
fiscal expansion but also, if not mainly, due to the operation of automatic stabilizers). A few EU 
countries,  especially  those  that  had  maintained  elevated  public  debt  levels  already  in  2008, 
experienced severe sovereign solvency pressures in 2010. These problems heralded a new stage of 
the crisis, during which the original private sector solvency problems eventually spilled over to the 
public sector. As a consequence, all EU countries are currently confronted with the challenge to 
implement decisive fiscal action to consolidate their budgets, a process that will have to continue in 
most countries until 2012−13. 
Given the scale of both the fiscal stimulus packages during this crisis and the ensuing 
austerity measures, the obvious question that arises is how effective can fiscal policy actually be in 
mitigating business cycle fluctuations, especially within the financial and economic architecture of 
today’s highly interdependent world. Generally speaking, fiscal multipliers are smaller if there are 
considerable leakages (i.e. parts of the stimulus are saved, e.g. for precautionary reasons, or spent 
on imports). Multi-country models show that fiscal multipliers are the smaller, the more open an 
economy is (see Spilimbergo et al., 2009). Thus it is important to examine not only the impact of 
domestic fiscal shocks
3 on output, but also to study the channels and the extent of spillovers from 
fiscal shocks generated in major foreign trading and financial partner countries.  
Empirical evidence on the economic effects of domestic fiscal shocks is mostly available 
for high-income OECD countries (e.g., Blanchard and Perotti, 2002 for the U.S.A.; Perotti, 2004, 
for the U.S.A., the U.K., Australia and Germany; Giordano et al., 2007, for Italy; de Castro and 
Hernández de Cos, 2008, for Spain), while there is only scant, mostly preliminary, evidence for the 
economies  in  emerging  Europe (e.g.,  Lendvai,  2007, for Hungary;  Benčík,  2009, for Slovakia; 
Mirdala,  2009,  for  the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland,  Slovakia,  Bulgaria  and  Romania;  or 
Ponomarenko and Vlasov, 2010, for Russia). Moreover, there have been only limited empirical 
                                                 
3 A fiscal shock is defined as an unexpected, random discretionary change in government spending or taxation. Our 
approach assumes symmetry of results, i.e. we do not impose a different reaction to fiscal expansions than for fiscal 
contractions in our setting. Thus, any argument put forward for a fiscal expansion holds inversely also for a fiscal con-
traction (see also our qualifications in section 4.2). Jesús Crespo Cuaresma, Markus Eller and Aaron Mehrotra 
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attempts to examine the transmission of a foreign fiscal shock to domestic macroeconomic variables 
in Europe (among others, Beetsma et al., 2006, or Badarinza, 2008). 
This paper focuses on five Central and Eastern European economies (the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, in the following referred to as CEE-5)
4 and develops a 
model that allows not only to examine the impact of domestic fiscal shocks on key macroeconomic 
variables, but also to check the response of domestic variables to a fiscal shock in an important 
foreign economic partner country. We chose Germany to be this country, first, because the CEE-5 
have strong trade relations with Germany (on average, about 30% of total CEE-5 exports go to 
Germany)  and  second,  because  over  the  past  few  years,  Germany  implemented  considerable 
discretionary fiscal  measures,
5  which potentially induced substantial  economic  spillovers  to  the 
CEE-5.  
Learning more about such spillovers is also important given that the crisis left only limited 
room for sizable stimulus packages in the CEE-5 (Hungary even had to implement pro-cyclical 
consolidation measures amounting to more than 4% of GDP, according to the OECD, 2009) owing 
to  a  predominantly  pro-cyclical  fiscal  stance  during  the  pre-crisis  boom  period  and  liquidity 
constraints at  government debt markets in many  of these countries (see Eller, 2009).  It is also 
interesting to examine what types of responses can be observed in the CEE-5 for the period 1995-
2009: Did these countries respond to a fiscal expansion in Germany with fiscal easing, or did they 
count on positive cross-border fiscal multipliers in their consolidation efforts? 
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the channels of the cross-
country transmission of fiscal shocks and describes the development of an open economy structural 
vector autoregressive (SVAR) model with both foreign and domestic  fiscal shocks. This model 
requires a detailed documentation of the restrictions imposed on contemporaneous responses in the 
system, which are necessary to achieve identification. Section 3 discusses the preparation of the 
data series and the empirical specification of the SVAR model. The estimation results and some 
robustness checks are described in section 4. Section 5 summarizes the basic findings and highlights 
their implications for policymaking and further research. 
 
                                                 
4 Other countries from Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe could not be included due to the lack of satisfactory 
fiscal data. 
5  According to the European Commission (2009), the cumulative 2009−10 net effect of the German fiscal stimulus 
package  is  estimated  to  amount  to  1.9%  of  2008  GDP  (with  revenue-decreasing  effects  outweighing  expenditure-
increasing ones, and about 70% of the stimulus occurring in 2009 and the rest in 2010). The same study also estimated 
the size of the corresponding stimulus packages in the CEE-5 (except for Hungary, which implemented a pro-cyclical 
consolidation package, and Slovakia, which provided a negligibly small stimulus package) to be 1.5% of GDP in Po-
land and 0.5% of GDP in the Czech Republic and Slovenia respectively.  
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2  Theory and methodology 
 
2.1  Cross-country transmission of fiscal shocks 
 
Conceptually, the literature in this area relies on the framework of a two-country Mundell-Fleming 
model with flexible prices to distinguish at least three channels for the cross-country transmission of 
fiscal shocks (see Beetsma et al., 2006, or Badarinza, 2008).  
First, a fiscal expansion in a foreign economy increases aggregate demand and thus also 
the  demand  for  domestic  goods  and  services  through  the  trade  channel,  which,  in  turn,  has  a 
positive effect on domestic output.  
Second,  a  foreign  fiscal  expansion  affects  domestic  output  via  terms-of-trade  changes 
through  the  real  exchange  rate  channel.  In  the  foreign  economy,  prices  increase  after  a  fiscal 
expansion due to higher aggregate demand; and they are expected to increase more strongly than 
world market prices since the latter are typically not affected one-to-one by the fiscal action of a 
single country. As a consequence, the terms of trade of the foreign country improve as the real 
effective exchange rate appreciates and imports increase (while exports decrease). The domestic 
economy benefits from this situation in terms of higher output as long as it is a net exporter to the 
foreign economy.  
Third, the interest rate channel captures the impact of a rising interest rate in a foreign 
economy after a fiscal expansion; this interest rise could either be due to a non-accommodative 
monetary tightening to keep inflation in check or due to the pressure on investments induced by 
higher aggregate demand. The higher foreign interest rate could then translate into higher domestic 
interest rates (with a negative impact on domestic output), simply due to the fact that a higher 
foreign interest rate attracts more capital imports from the domestic economy, reducing domestic 
exchange reserves and thus also domestic money supply. 
The specific sign and size of the cross-border fiscal multiplier depend on the interaction 
between these different  channels. The overall impact of a fiscal expansion abroad on domestic 
output is expected to be positive if the trade and exchange rate effects outweigh the negative interest 
rate  effect.  Certainly,  the  actual  cross-border  effect  depends  on  a  number  of  country-specific 
characteristics,  such  as  the  degree  of  bilateral  trade  integration,  the  structure  of  bilateral  trade 
balances, the exchange rate system, the size of the country where the expansion is generated, the Jesús Crespo Cuaresma, Markus Eller and Aaron Mehrotra 
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degree of capital mobility, or the behavior of the central bank.
6 This theoretical ambiguity calls for 
answers from an empirical investigation. Using the methodological framework described below, we 
investigate how domestic macroeconomic variables respond to a foreign fiscal impulse. While the 
interest channel can be explicitly considered in this framework, the trade channel and the exchange 
rate channel can be addressed only implicitly (via the direct domestic output response) given that 
we do not include trade volumes in our setting to keep the model tractable.
7 
 
2.2  Open economy structural VAR model with fiscal shocks 
 
 
To  get  information  on  the  size  of  fiscal  multipliers,  a  structural  vector  autoregressive  (SVAR) 
model in the tradition of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) has been frequently implemented. Building 
on this approach, we develop an open economy SVAR model accounting for both foreign and 
domestic fiscal shocks, imposing contemporaneous restrictions to achieve identification. 
 
We consider the structural form of a vector autoregressive (VAR) model: 
 
  , ) ( = 1 0 t t t x L x  B A A     (1) 
 
where  0 A  is the  m m  matrix of contemporaneous effects,  ) (L A  represents the impact of 
lagged effects (matrix lag operator notation
8) and B is a  m m  structural form parameter matrix. 




9, domestic government purchases of goods and services ( t g ), domestic net taxation (
t  ), domestic output ( t y ), nominal effective exchange rate ( t e ), domestic inflation ( t  ) and a short-
                                                 
6 Simulations by Breuss (2006), applying both a calibrated two-country Mundell-Fleming model with flexible prices 
and the Oxford Economic Forecasting World Model, have shown that the cross-border effect will be bigger if the fiscal 
shock is generated in a large economy, if there is a fixed exchange rate system (as in this case the output increase is not 
reduced by an appreciation that would be implemented in a flexible exchange rate system to counteract increasing do-
mestic prices) or if the central bank pursues an accommodative policy. 
7 Even if we were able to include trade-related variables, it would be difficult to empirically disentangle the exchange 
rate channel from the trade channel (see Badarinza, 2008) as, in the end, both of them affect output via changes in trade 
volumes. Moreover, we do not incorporate a real exchange rate but a nominal one, which enters into a type of arbitrage 
equation for the foreign exchange market (in line with Dungey and Fry, 2009, and Kožluk and Mehrotra, 2009). 
8 q t q t t t x x x x L        A A A A  2 2 1 1 1 = ) (
, where  j A
 are  m m  matrices for each  q j , 1, =  . 
9 Note that the foreign fiscal balance is scaled to GDP and inversely defined to interpret an increase in 
*
t f
 as a fiscal 
expansion, i.e.   
* * * * = y g f t t t   . We do not distinguish between a spending and a net tax shock in the foreign coun-
try to keep the model tractable.  
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run interest rate ( t i ), i.e.   

t t t t t t t t i e y g f x  
* = . The structural shocks, denoted by  t  , 
are assumed to be linearly related to the structural model residuals with zero mean and a diagonal 
variance-covariance  matrix,  i.e.  t  ~    
2 diag = 0, i    .  The  corresponding  reduced  form  VAR 
model is given by: 
 
  , ) ( = 1 t t t u x L R x     (2) 
 
where  ) ( = ) (
1
0 L L R A A
  and  t t u  B A
1
0 =
 . Using this relation between reduced form residuals and 




0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
=
1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
1
0 0 0 1
0 0.5 0 0.8 1 0 0
0 0.5 0 0 0 1 0
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  (3) 
 
with  the  innovations  (reduced  form  residuals)  that  may  be  correlated,  i.e.  for  any  l k, -pair  of 




t u u ,  and  the  structural  shocks  that  are 




t   .  0 A  contains the contemporaneous responses of variable  k  to an 
innovation in variable  l , and  kl   can thus be interpreted in terms of an elasticity. For the fiscal 
variables,  kl    captures  both  the  automatic  response  (automatic  stabilizers)  and  the  systematic 
discretionary response to innovations in the other system variables. B, on the other hand, contains Jesús Crespo Cuaresma, Markus Eller and Aaron Mehrotra 
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the contemporaneous responses of variable  k  to a structural (exogenous) shock in variable  l . The 
structural fiscal shocks (






) represent the random discretionary shocks to fiscal policies (for 
this type of classification see Perotti, 2004). 
 
 
2.3   Restrictions on contemporaneous responses in the system to achieve 
identification 
 
In line with the order conditions by Breitung et al. (2004),  1)/2 ( 2
2   m m m  restrictions have to be 
imposed to achieve just-identification of equation (3). In our case  7 = m , i.e. we need a total of 70 
restrictions on  0 A  and B. One can see in equation (3) that we have actually imposed 73 restrictions 
– the validity of this over-identifying situation will be tested later on by means of a likelihood ratio 
test. The restrictions and the underlying economic assumptions are discussed in detail below. 
 
 
2.3.1  Restrictions on fiscal responses 
 
In our model the domestic economy is assumed to be small and open (CEE country) that is strongly 
integrated with a large foreign economy (euro area, Germany as proxy as discussed already in the 
introduction) so that a fiscal shock in the foreign country could have a considerable impact on the 
domestic economy (but not necessarily the other way round). We assume that the large foreign 
country is a “fiscal leader” and does not react – at least not in the same quarter – to changes in 
variables of the domestic economy. Consequently,  0 = *l f  , 
* f l   , in the first row of equation 
(3). A similar reasoning is provided by Kožluk and Mehrotra (2009) to model the spillover of a 
monetary  policy  shock  in  a  large  foreign  country  (China)  to  small  and  open  trading  partner 
economies (Southeast Asia). 
The  second  and  third  rows  in  equation  (3)  describe  the  domestic  fiscal  responses  to 
innovations in the other system variables. We build on a series of closed economy fiscal SVARs 
that  have  been  implemented  for  a  small  but  growing  sample  of  OECD  countries  using  the 
identification approach developed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). The key to identification here is 
the observation that it takes typically more than a quarter for fiscal policymakers to respond to, say, 
an output shock because of decision lags. The systematic discretionary response contained in  kl   
can therefore be set to zero when using quarterly data. As a result, we are left with the automatic  
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response only, for which we can use available external information or reasonable assumptions on 
the elasticity of public spending and net taxes. 
Let us first identify the structural fiscal shocks on the right-hand side of equation (3). Like 
Giordano et al. (2007), who also investigated a SVAR with three fiscal variables, we achieve a 
Cholesky-type identification by imposing assumptions on the ordering among the structural fiscal 
shocks. As mentioned before, we assume that the large foreign country is the fiscal leader, and thus 
the decision on the foreign fiscal balance “comes first”. That is,  0 = = * *   
f g f , while both  * gf   
and  * f     are  expected  to  be  different  from  zero,  allowing  domestic  fiscal  policy  to  react 
contemporaneously to a foreign fiscal shock. We further assume that spending decisions by the 
government are taken before taxes are set, i.e.  0 =  g  while  0  g   .  
In  a  second  step  we  can  now  make  additional  assumptions  on  the  elasticities  of  the 
domestic fiscal variables with respect to the macroeconomic variables in the system (relevant for 
the restrictions in matrix  0 A  and to be interpreted as automatic response of fiscal variables to 
innovations in the macroeconomic variables):   
 
  Output  elasticity  of  public  spending:  Under  the  EU's  fiscal  surveillance  framework,  the 
European Commission (2004) estimates budgetary elasticities of the EU Member States on a 
regular  basis.  According  to  these  estimates,  a  1%  decline  in  GDP  drives  up  government 
spending on average by nearly 0.1% in the CEE-5. The lion's share of this pretty inelastic 
response of public spending to output can be attributed to unemployment benefits, which are 
not included in our spending measure but enter with a negative sign into the net tax variable 
(see also section 3.1). Our spending variable consists of the sum of government consumption 
and government gross fixed capital formation, of which public wages account for, on average, 
nearly  50%.  Typically,  public  wages  show  a  certain  inertia  in  adjusting  to  business  cycle 
fluctuations. For example, a temporary output decline does not induce immediate lay-offs of 
public sector employees. Given all these facts, we feel safe to assume that  0 = gy  . 
  
  Output elasticity of net taxes: Existing fiscal SVAR investigations for various OECD countries 
mainly  follow  the  approach  of  Blanchard  and  Perotti  (2002)  and  compute  elasticities  for 
different types of taxes and transfers. Weighted averages are then calculated over these sub-
elasticities to get  y   . The following tax revenue categories are distinguished: personal income 
taxes, corporate income taxes, indirect taxes (e.g. VAT), social security contributions and all 
other current and capital transfers that government receives (e.g. property or inheritance taxes). 
The literature uses a mixture of assumptions and estimations to get the elasticity for each of 
these categories. For instance, de Castro and Hernández de Cos (2008) regress the growth rate 
of  each  tax  base  on  GDP  growth  and  take  the  estimated  slope  coefficient  as  the  output Jesús Crespo Cuaresma, Markus Eller and Aaron Mehrotra 
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elasticity.
10 Perotti (2004) and Giordano et al. (2007) employ similar regressions but also use 
some simplifying assumptions, such as an elasticity of one for indirect taxes, an elasticity of 
zero for corporate income taxes if they are collected with a lag longer than a quarter (e.g. in 
Germany), an  elasticity  of zero for property and inheritance taxes  as  they are likely to  be 
inelastic  to  output  at  a  quarterly  frequency,  or  an  elasticity  of  0.2    for  transfers.
11  The 
resulting value for  y    is 0.5 in Italy, 0.62 in Spain, 0.76 in the U.K., 0.92 in Germany and 1.85 
in the U.S.A. In the case of Germany, the calibration of  y    is primarily determined by the 
assumption of unit-elastic indirect taxes as the estimated output elasticity of personal income 
taxes is statistically not different from zero (see Perotti, 2004). In this paper we assume for the 
CEE-5 a benchmark elasticity of  0.8 = y   . This is supported by the European Commission's 
estimates of the output elasticity of total government revenues, ranging from 0.88 in Slovakia 
to 1.02 in Hungary and Slovenia (reported in Eller, 2009), and mildly corrected downward 
because of the small output elasticity of transfers. Furthermore, the share of indirect taxes in 
total general  government revenues is comparatively high in the CEE-5 (on average clearly 
above 30%), which also backs a value for  y    that is not too far away from that of Germany. 
 
  Price elasticity of  public spending:  Following  Perotti  (2004), we  can  distinguish  the wage 
component from the non-wage component of public purchases of goods and services. On the 
one hand, public wages may be indexed to inflation; however, it is quite unlikely that this 
indexation occurs within a quarter. This implies a quarterly elasticity of real public wages to 
inflation of  1  , i.e. in real terms (we are using real-valued variables in the estimations) public 
wages shrink proportionally to the increase in inflation. On the other hand, we can assume that 
a considerable part of the non-wage component of public spending is indexed to the price level 
within a quarter, implying an elasticity of zero in real terms for these spending categories. 
Given  that  in  the  CEE-5  public  wages  account  for  nearly  50%  of  the  employed  spending 
measure (except for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, for each of which a share of about 30% 
applies), Perotti's benchmark of  0.5 =   g  provides a reasonable upper bound that we use in 
our baseline specification, assuming that the whole non-wage component is indexed to the price 
level within a quarter. At the other extreme – under the assumption that there is no quarterly 
price indexation for all spending categories – we get  1 =   g  as a lower bound. Thus, a range 
of parameters for    0.5 1,    g  can be considered; the impact of different calibrations will be 
checked in the robustness section. 
 
  Price elasticity of net taxes: Existing fiscal SVAR studies calculate     analogously to  y    by 
distinguishing between different tax categories. While the elasticity for personal income taxes 
and social security contributions is typically estimated (   , dirtax ), some simplifying assumptions 
are used for the other categories, such as a price elasticity of zero for real corporate income 
taxes  and for real  indirect  taxes  (corresponds  to unitary  elasticities in  nominal  terms). For 
transfers, a similar argument as for public wages is applied, namely a lack of quarterly price 
indexation and thus a price elasticity of  1   in real terms. As a result, the literature gets a 
                                                 
10 However, besides GDP growth, only a time trend is included as explanatory variable, making the estimations suscep-
tible to omitted variable biases. This is admittedly difficult to resolve given a considerable degree of model uncertainty 
in these estimations. 
11 The number is not higher as, basically, only unemployment benefits respond to output changes within a quarter, and 
they account only for a small share in total primary expenditures.  
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positive value for    , which is largely driven by the negative transfer elasticity and is 0.78 in 
Spain (de Castro and Hernández de Cos, 2008), 0.87 in Germany, 1.21 in the U.K. and 1.25 in 
the U.S.A. (Perotti, 2004). Given the stated assumptions,  0 =    if  1 = ,   dirtax ,  1 =    if 
0 = , dirtax , and  1 >    if  0 > , dirtax . In this paper we start with the benchmark of  0.5 =    
(i.e.  0.5 = ,   dirtax ) and then try different calibrations within reasonable ranges (see section 
4.2). 
 
  Exchange  rate  elasticities  of  fiscal  variables:  We  set  0 = = e ge      because  the 
contemporaneous response of domestic fiscal variables to exchange rate innovations is deemed 
to be negligible. This assumption is also backed by Dungey and Fry (2009) – one of the rare 
papers  that  also  includes  exchange  rates  into  a  fiscal  SVAR  to  identify  jointly  fiscal  and 
monetary shocks (for New Zealand). 
 
  Interest  rate  elasticities  of  fiscal  variables:  We  set  0 = = i gi      because  our  revenue  and 
expenditure data do not include property income or interest payments on public debt (in line 
with Perotti, 2004). 
 
 
2.3.2   Restrictions on non-fiscal responses 
 
In the fourth row of equation (3) we let real GDP respond contemporaneously to the fiscal vari-
ables, while output does not respond to prices, interest rates and exchange rates within a quarter. 
For the former assumption, one could argue that it takes more than a quarter for fiscal policy to af-
fect  the  economy because of implementation  lags  (argument  put  forward by  Fatás and Mihov, 
2001). However, as Perotti (2004) emphasized, government spending is a component of GDP, and 
if we set  yg   to be zero, we would implausibly assume that an increase in public spending crowds 
out private GDP one-to-one. A similar argument can be put forward for net taxes, as they are a 
component of disposable income, and for the foreign fiscal balance, if we assume that a foreign fis-
cal shock has an immediate effect on domestic exports that are, again, a component of GDP. 
In rows five and seven of equation (3) we treat the interest rate and the exchange rate as 
“fast” financial variables that immediately react to innovations in the other system’s variables, with 
one notable exception:  0  iy  . This restriction is, as in the case of the fiscal policy response, 
backed by the assumptions that it takes more than a quarter for the central bank to react to an output 
shock due to decision lags or due to the lack of real-time output data (therefore the systematic 
discretionary response is zero) and the automatic response (say, a reduction of interest rates due to 
less  credit  demand  in  the  case  of  a  slowing  economy)  does  not  immediately  materialize  as Jesús Crespo Cuaresma, Markus Eller and Aaron Mehrotra 
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commercial banks set their interest rates more in line with central bank rate adjustments than in 
response to short-run credit demand fluctuations. 
Finally, in row six we apply a “sticky” Calvo pricing scheme,
12 analogously to Kožluk and 
Mehrotra (2009), and assume that inflation does not respond within a quarter to innovations in the 
other  system's  variables,  except  for  a  non-zero  response  to  output  that  can  be  motivated  by 
automatic price markups in the case of soaring aggregate demand. 
 
 
3  Data and empirical specification 
 
3.1  Data issues 
 
There is a broad discussion in the literature whether different types of public expenditures and 
revenues  have  a  different  impact  on  economic  output.  This  discussion  is  based  on,  inter  alia, 
endogenous growth theory that distinguishes between “productive” and “non-productive” public 
spending as well as “distortionary” and “non-distortionary” taxation and assigns a different long-run 
growth impact to these categories (see, e.g., Devarajan et al., 1996). Investigations for Hungary 
(Horváth et al., 2006, and Lendvai, 2007) show that the composition of domestic fiscal shocks is 
particularly important when it comes to evaluating the effects of fiscal policy. 
Given that we have only a limited degree of freedom in our model due to comparatively 
short data series for the CEE-5, we choose to address these composition arguments by a two-way 
breakdown of the government budget and use a narrow definition of government spending and taxa-
tion to fit more clearly the direct impact of a fiscal action on the use of resources by the private sec-
tor (in line with Perotti, 2004). We argue that public spending on goods and services has different 
effects than transfers: Only the former affects directly the use of resources. Hence, our variable for 
government  purchases  of  goods  and  services  ( t g )  consists  of  government  consumption  plus 
government  investment,  while  transfers  are  subtracted  from  government  revenues  to  get  our 
variable for net taxes ( t  ). The inclusion of net taxes should capture the net impact on the private 
sector and is supported by the view that in the short and medium run fiscal policy operates mostly 
via a demand channel. The foreign fiscal balance is also constructed according to these definitions 
and scaled to GDP.  
 
                                                 
12 The price stickiness helps to obtain an increase in the real interest rate that also brings about a monetary contraction.  
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For the fiscal variables we use quarterly budgetary data from the Quarterly Non-Financial 
Accounts  for  General  Government  (QNFAGG)  of  Eurostat’s  Government  Finance  Statistics. 
Several  characteristics  of  this  dataset  are  of  relevance  for  our  empirical  investigation.  First, 
compilation practices differ across countries and across different expenditure and revenue items (for 
an overview, see European Communities, 2006). Basic data are transformed by Eurostat to fully 
comply with the European System of Accounts 1995 (ESA 95) and to ensure comparability between 
countries. Second, raw data series are collected at different frequencies. While tax data are available 
from tax offices at monthly frequency, a few items are missing at quarterly frequency (e.g. public 
wages  in  kind)  and  are  estimated  based  on  previous  years’  data  or  on  budget  data.  Third, 
adjustments are implemented in the compiled data to deliver satisfactory accrual figures (e.g. cash-
based tax data are time-adjusted with a one-month delay to obtain accrual data). The usage of ac-
crual figures (an expense is recorded when goods are delivered or services are rendered) is impor-
tant for our setting as they capture the effective economic response to a fiscal shock better than cash 
data. Fourth, QNFAGG data have been available for the CEE-5 only since 1999, and thus we use 
annual figures for the years 1995 to 1998 and the seasonal pattern of the years 1999 to 2009 to 











, with F  representing the 
respective fiscal variable,  i  denoting quarters and T=2009. Finally, concerning the overall quality 
of  QNFAGG  data  for  the  CEE-5,  the  quality  report  of  Eurostat  (2008)  confirms  considerable 
advances (compared to 2006) with regard to the consistency between quarterly and annual data, the 
timeliness and coverage of data, or the estimation of accrual data on a quarterly basis. Further 
improvements are requested for budgetary revisions, whose impact should be reduced further.  
In the estimations we use quarterly data (from the first quarter of 1995 to the fourth quarter 
of 2009) that are real-valued, seasonally adjusted and denominated in local currency. Output, fiscal 
variables and the nominal effective exchange rate are expressed in logs. The fiscal variables are 
available in nominal terms only and so we deflated them by using the CPI. Both output and fiscal 
variables show a strong seasonal pattern; hence they were seasonally detrended by applying the 
Tramo-Seats  procedure  (also  used  by,  among  others,  Giordano  et  al.,  2007).  Table  A.1  in  the 
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3.2   Empirical specification of the model  
 
The reduced form VARs are estimated by ordinary least squares in levels form, allowing cointegra-
tion between the variables. The choice of lag length for the models reflects the use of quarterly data 
and a rather short estimation sample. We also consider the results from misspecification tests, in 
particular in order to avoid residual autocorrelation. The resulting lag lengths amount to 2 in the 
case of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, and to 3 for Slovakia. All models in-
clude a constant and a linear trend as deterministic terms.
13 The estimation samples for the individ-
ual economies are as follows: Q1 1995 to Q4 2009 for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, 
and Q1 1996 to Q4 2009 for Slovakia and Slovenia.  
The structural form VARs are then estimated by maximum likelihood and a scoring algo-
rithm, using the estimated variance-covariance matrix from the reduced form VAR (see Breitung et 
al., 2004).
14 Attaining convergence is complicated in our system due to the relatively large number 
of variables in relation to the sample size. A slight variation of the specification across countries 
helped to resolve this issue. In the cases of Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia we smoothed the domes-
tic fiscal variables using four-quarter moving averages to account for short-term volatility that was 
not fully eliminated by the Tramo-Seats seasonal adjustment procedure. Further, in the case of Po-
land, the foreign fiscal shock is specified as a shock to the primary general government fiscal bal-
ance-to-GDP ratio.  
The validity of the three overidentifying restrictions is tested by a likelihood ratio test. The 
overidentifying restrictions are rejected at a 5% significance level only in the case of Slovenia.
15 
The impact of structural fiscal shocks is evaluated by impulse responses. In order to account for pa-
rameter uncertainty, we use Hall percentile 95% confidence intervals, obtained by bootstrapping 
methods with 1,000 replications (see Benkwitz et al., 2001). As our main interest is in the long-run 
impact of fiscal shocks, we examine the accumulated impulse responses over time.  
 
 
                                                 
13 A constant only is included in the case of Poland to attain convergence in the estimation of the structural form coeffi-
cients. A shift dummy variable is also included in the cases of Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, taking the value 1 during 
2000Q2-2000Q4 and 0 otherwise in order to deal with residual outliers (due to selling of UMTS licenses in Germany in 
this period that had a considerable non-discretionary one-off effect on the German fiscal balance).   
14 For the SVAR estimation we use the software JMulTi, developed by Lütkepohl and Krätzig (2004), downloadable 
from http://www.jmulti.de. 
15 The test statistic from the likelihood test amounts to 0.711 for Poland (p-value: 0.871), 2.627 (p-value: 0.453) for the 
Czech Republic, 5.038 (p-value: 0.169) for Hungary, 2.141 (p-value: 0.544) for Slovakia, and 17.584 (p-value: 0.001) 
for Slovenia. Although the results of the test for Slovenia would imply that probably we should work with a just-
identified model, we decided to use the overidentified model for consistency reasons.  
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4  The Economic effects of fiscal shocks 
 
4.1   Baseline results 
 
In this section we analyze the effects of fiscal shocks implied by the model estimates. The structural 
VAR approach allows the empirical assessment of many potential links between macroeconomic 
variables, but in this study we concentrate on the reactions to structural fiscal shocks, both foreign 
and domestic. We start by analyzing cross-country fiscal spillovers and then turn to the reaction of 
domestic variables to domestic fiscal shocks.  
The estimated structural fiscal shocks for the CEE-5 and Germany (available from the au-
thors upon request) reassemble well-known periods of fiscal tightening (such as in Germany in 
2000  and  2007,  in  the  Czech  Republic  in  2005,  in  Poland  in  2005  and  2007,  in  Slovakia  in 
2002−03, or in Slovenia in 2002) and fiscal easing (in Germany in 2002−03 and 2005, in Poland in 
2004, in Slovakia in 2000, in Slovenia in 2001, and in Hungary in 2006). In the context of the 
2008−09 crisis, expansionary fiscal shocks can be observed in all these countries, except for Hun-
gary, where the pro-cyclical fiscal consolidation is reflected by – on average – positive shocks to 
net taxes and negative shocks to government spending. Negative tax shocks are most pronounced in 
this period in the Czech Republic, while positive spending shocks predominate in both the Czech 
Republic and Poland. 
The results in terms of how variables respond to temporary structural shocks in fiscal vari-
ables (both domestic and foreign) are presented in tables 1 to 3, charts 1 to 3 and charts 5 and 6. The 
tables show the cumulative reaction of each variable to each one of the structural fiscal shocks of 
the system after two, four and eight quarters. The charts are cumulative impulse-response functions 
depicting  the  reaction  of  real  GDP  and  domestic  fiscal  variables  to  temporary  structural  (1%) 
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We find that there are considerable feedback effects between the foreign fiscal variable and the two 
domestic fiscal variables. On the one hand, if Germany implements a fiscal expansion, all the CEE-
5 will respond with an expansion of public purchases of goods and services (the response is particu-
larly strong in Hungary and the Czech Republic); in Slovenia, the response is reversed after the sec-
ond year of reaction (see chart 1).16 The Czech Republic and Slovakia respond with a sizeable cut 
in taxes and Slovenia with a fairly small one, while in Hungary and Poland net taxes do not respond 
to the foreign shock (see chart 2). On the other hand, our model estimates imply that the German 
fiscal balance responds to fiscal shocks in the CEE-5 as well (see tables 2 and 3). This result is, 
however, not that robust when we use alternative specifications (see section 4.2).  
 
                                                 
16 Such an empirical mechanism concerning the propagation of fiscal shocks in the euro area to the Polish economy is 
also found in Kolasa (2009), who uses a DSGE framework. 
Table 1: Cumulative Responses to a Foreign Fiscal Shock 
8
gov. spending g 0.6 2.4 * 7.8 * 2.2 * 6.0 * 14.8 * 0.6 * 1.1 * 1.8 * 1.2 3.1 * 3.9 0.3 0.3 -0.6 *
net taxes t -8.1 * -12.4 * -16.2 * -0.5 -1.0 -2.0 -0.6 -1.1 -1.9 -0.4 -3.4 -11.8 * -0.5 -1.6 -3.1 *
output y -0.6 * -1.6 * -4.0 * -0.1 0.3 2.6 0.9 * 1.3 * 2.6 * -3.7 * -6.1 * -4.3 * -1.2 * -2.0 * -2.4 *
exchange rate e 1.3 * 2.3 * 1.7 0.9 2.7 * 6.0 * -0.9 -1.1 -1.5 -0.8 -1.9 * -2.5 0.3 0.1 -1.0
inflation rate π 0.0 -0.4 -1.5 * -0.2 -0.6 -1.4 -0.8 * -1.2 * -1.7 * -0.6 -0.5 -4.3 * -0.4 -0.9 * -1.5 *
interest rate i 0.3 0.8 1.4 * -0.3 -0.7 -1.1 -0.5 -1.4 * -2.5 * -0.4 -1.2 1.0 -0.4 * -0.5 * -0.8 *
8 4 2 8 4 2 8 4 2
Slovenia Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Slovakia
8 4 2 2 4
Note: This table shows the cumulative response (in %) of the endogeneous variables at quarters 2, 4, and 8 after a temporary shock in the German fiscal balance-
to-GDP ratio (easing of the German fiscal balance by 1% of GDP). An asterisk indicates statistical significance in the sense that the 95% Hall percentile 
confidence interval (obtained by bootstrapping methods with 1,000 replications) does not include a zero impulse response.
Table 2: Cumulative Responses to a Domestic Spending Shock
8
foreign fiscal balance f* 0.20 * 0.78 * 2.10 * -0.28 * -0.62 * -1.06 * 0.26 0.73 * 1.73 * -0.06 -0.17 -0.42 -0.02 0.30 1.09 *
net taxes t -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 0.05 * 0.07 * 0.06 * -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 *
output y 0.00 * -0.01 * -0.04 * 0.01 * 0.02 * 0.01 0.00 -0.01 * -0.02 * -0.01 * -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01
exchange rate e 0.01 0.03 * 0.03 * 0.03 * 0.05 * 0.06 * 0.02 * 0.03 * 0.01 0.02 * 0.02 * 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 *
inflation rate π 2.50 * 2.20 * 0.23 3.12 * 4.64 * 6.42 * 2.46 * 3.36 * 3.82 * 3.04 * 1.86 * -0.01 1.45 * 1.56 * 1.32 *
interest rate i 0.66 * 0.51 -0.39 0.85 * 1.72 * 3.37 * 1.47 * 2.27 * 2.43 * 0.76 * 1.18 * 1.96 0.28 0.26 -0.06
Slovenia Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Slovakia
8 4 2 2 4 8 2 8 4 2 4 2 8 4
Note: This table shows the cumulative response (in %) of the endogeneous variables at quarters 2, 4, and 8 after a temporary 1% shock in domestic public 
purchases of goods and services. An asterisk indicates statistical significance in the sense that the 95% Hall percentile confidence interval (obtained by 
bootstrapping methods with 1,000 replications) does not include a zero impulse response.
Table 3: Cumulative Responses to a Domestic Taxation Shock
8
foreign fiscal balance f* -0.12 -0.48 * -1.55 * 0.34 * 0.85 * 1.71 * -0.73 * -1.73 * -3.90 * 0.38 * 1.33 * 3.20 * -0.06 -0.44 * -0.95 *
gov. spending g 0.01 * 0.02 * 0.02 0.02 * 0.03 * 0.05 * 0.01 * 0.02 * 0.04 * 0.02 * 0.03 * -0.01 0.01 * 0.01 * 0.01 *
output y 0.00 0.01 0.03 * 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 * -0.02 * -0.05 * -0.10 * 0.01 * 0.02 * 0.02 *
exchange rate e 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 * -0.03 * 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
inflation rate π -0.01 -0.16 0.34 -0.49 -1.12 * -1.69 * 0.19 0.88 * 3.18 * 0.88 * 2.25 * 2.51 * 0.15 0.84 * 1.46 *
interest rate i -0.22 -0.59 -0.90 * -0.18 -0.19 -0.40 -0.04 0.43 3.00 * -1.00 * -2.42 * -5.33 * -0.12 0.38 0.77 *
8 4 2 8 4 2 8 4 2
Slovenia Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Slovakia
8 4 2 2 4
Note: This table shows the cumulative response (in %) of the endogeneous variables at quarters 2, 4, and 8 after a temporary 1% shock in domestic net taxes. 
An asterisk indicates statistical significance in the sense that the 95% Hall percentile confidence interval (obtained by bootstrapping methods with 1,000 
replications) does not include a zero impulse response. 
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Source: Authors' calculations.  
 
Note: The curves represent the cumulative median response of domestic government spending to a temporary shock in the German 
fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio (easing of the German fiscal balance by 1% of GDP) and the 95% Hall percentile confidence bands (dot-
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Source: Authors' calculations.  
 
Note: The curves represent the cumulative median response of domestic net taxes to a temporary shock in the German fiscal bal-
ance-to-GDP ratio (easing of the German fiscal balance by 1% of GDP) and the 95% Hall percentile confidence bands (dotted lines), 
obtained by bootstrapping methods with 1,000 replications. 
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Fiscal shocks in Germany and the reactions in the CEE-5’s GDP apparently involve both negative 
and positive cross-border spillovers (see chart 3). In Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, 
output reacts negatively to a fiscal expansion in Germany (in Slovakia, this response is statistically 
significant only up to the second year after the shock). The effect is strongest in Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic, where after a temporary 1 percentage point shock in the German fiscal balance-to-
GDP ratio real GDP contracts by 4% cumulatively over two years. In both countries, foreign fiscal 
expansion is accompanied by an increase in domestic government spending and interest rates,
17 
both of which have a negative impact on output (see also below). Thus, on the one hand, this result 
corroborates the view that the negative interest rate channel outweighs the potentially positive trade 
and exchange rate channels in these two countries. On the other hand, the negative cross-border fis-
cal multiplier is transmitted here also via a non-Keynesian output response to a foreign-induced 
domestic fiscal expansion. The interest rate channel does not play a clear-cut role in Slovenia as in-
terest rates respond negatively to foreign fiscal expansion and there is no response of output to in-
terest rates. However, as in the Czech Republic, the foreign fiscal expansion results in cuts in net 
taxes, which have a negative impact on Slovenian output.
18  
In Poland and Hungary, a fiscal expansion in Germany has a positive impact on domestic 
output (in Hungary, the impact is statistically significant only ten quarters after the shock), pointing 
to a more dominant role of the trade and exchange rate channels here. The positive cross-border fis-
cal spillover in Hungary is consistent with spending reacting positively to the foreign fiscal expan-
sion and resulting in a positive output response. The positive transmission of a foreign fiscal expan-
sion to Poland can also be traced back to a negative response of the interest rate (policy-mix coordi-
nation could be the reason), which, in turn, has a positive effect on output. 
It could be argued that the quantitative importance of the trade channel may be related to 
the degree of trade integration between each one of the CEE-5 and Germany. Chart 4 presents a 
scatterplot showing the level of trade integration between the CEE-5 and Germany (average share 
of exports to Germany over total exports for the period 1999-2009) against the (median) accumu-
lated reaction of output to a fiscal shock in Germany after two years. The relationship between these 
                                                 
17 The positive response of the interest rate to a fiscal shock in Germany is statistically significant in Slovakia when a 
90% instead of a 95% confidence interval is used. 
18 It should be noted that the results for Slovakia and Slovenia are based on a sample which is dominated by the period 
when they were not members of the euro area. Current and future interest rate reactions are expected to be strongly in-
fluenced by the currency union framework. Jesús Crespo Cuaresma, Markus Eller and Aaron Mehrotra 
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two variables is rather weak, indicating that the role that integration plays as a factor modulating the 
propagation effects of foreign fiscal shocks is overcome by other transmission channels.
19  
 
Chart 3  Response of real GDP to a foreign fiscal shock 
 
 
Source: Authors' calculations.  
Note: The curves represent the cumulative median response of domestic real GDP to a temporary shock in the German fiscal bal-
ance-to-GDP ratio (easing of the German fiscal balance by 1% of GDP) and the 95% Hall percentile confidence bands (dotted lines), 
obtained by bootstrapping methods with 1,000 replications. 
                                                 
19 To examine cross-country differences in the response of domestic output to a foreign fiscal shock in a more instruc-
tive manner, it would be useful to present partial regression plots where the conditional correlation between the cumula-
tive impulse response and the variable of interest is shown and relevant country-specific characteristics are used as con-
trol variables (such as the structure and governance of fiscal policy, the degree of economic integration and openness, 
the size of and distance between the economies under investigation, the exchange rate system or the type of monetary 
policy reaction). However, this exercise makes only sense in a cross-section setting with considerably more than five 
observations. This is also why chart 4 – an unconditional correlation between the output response and trade integration 
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Chart 4 Cross-border spillover of a foreign riscal shock and degree of trade integration 
 
Source: Authors' estimations, Eurostat.  
 
The results concerning  domestic fiscal multipliers show a mixture of both Keynesian and non-
Keynesian responses of output to domestic fiscal expansions (see charts 5 and 6). Output in Hun-
gary tends to increase when fiscal policymakers implement a fiscal expansion. These reactions are, 
however, not very precisely estimated for net taxes and only statistically significant in the first year 
for spending; therefore they are relatively short-lived.
20 We can also observe a strong Keynesian 
response in Slovakia for the revenue side, where real GDP contracts by 0.1% cumulatively over two 
years after a (temporary) 1% shock to net taxes. Output in Poland and the Czech Republic, by con-
trast, responds in a non-Keynesian manner to a domestic fiscal shock: It decreases after a rise in 
public purchases of goods and services or a cut in net taxes. This also holds for Slovenia, but only 
for the revenue side. Non-Keynesian output responses to fiscal shocks – in particular to fiscal con-
tractions with the argument that fiscal tightness mitigates concerns about debt sustainability and re-
duces the expected tax burden on the private sector, thus stimulating private sector demand – were 
also found for the CEE-5 by Rzońca and Ciżkowicz (2005), for emerging market economies by 
Kandil and Morsy (2010) and for a sample of EU countries by Giudice et al. (2007). 
                                                 
20 It should be noted that our results for Hungary differ from those of Lendvai (2007), who finds for the period Q1 1997 
to Q4 2005 that increasing government expenditure leads to a contraction in GDP, using a structural VAR with a “Cho-
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Chart 5  Response of real GDP to a shock in domestic government spending 
 
Source: Authors' calculations.  
Note: The curves represent the cumulative median response of real GDP to a temporary 1% shock in domestic government spend-
ing. Based on 95% Hall percentile confidence bands (which are not shown here to get a better overview), statistical significance is 




Chart 6: Response of real GDP to a shock in domestic net taxes 
 
Source: Authors' calculations.  
Note: The curves represent the cumulative median response of real GDP to a temporary 1% shock in domestic net taxes. Based on 
95% Hall percentile confidence bands (which are not shown here to get a better overview), statistical significance is given for all 
shown quarters after the shock in Slovakia and Slovenia, in the Czech Republic starting with 6 quarters after the shock and in Poland 
starting with 8 quarters after the shock. 
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Further conclusions
21 concerning the response of fiscal policy to monetary shocks can be drawn 
from investigating the impulse response functions corresponding to the reaction of government ex-
penditure and net taxes to structural interest rate shocks. Accommodative fiscal policy on the ex-
penditure side can be observed in the Czech Republic, Hungary and, to a lesser extent, the Slovak 
Republic, where public spending decreases after a positive interest rate shock. In the Czech Repub-
lic and Hungary, by contrast, net taxes respond negatively to a shock in the interest rate. The net 
effect evaluated at the median response indicates that the non-accommodating effect tends to be 
slightly higher than the reduction of government expenditure following a contractive interest rate 
shock. 
 Turning to the reaction of monetary policy to fiscal policy shocks (see also tables 2 and 3), 
with the exception of Slovenia, all countries tend to react to an expansion of public spending by in-
creasing their interest rates (in Slovakia and the Czech Republic this response is statistically signifi-
cant only up to half a year after the shock). The reactions to shocks to net taxes are more heteroge-
neous across the CEE-5 economies: accommodative monetary policy (increase in the interest rate 
after a positive net tax shock) can be observed in Slovenia and Poland after the second year, and 
non-accommodative reactions are present in the Czech Republic.  
The analysis of the reaction of domestic fiscal variables to structural output shocks identi-
fies well-functioning responses related to automatic stabilizers. A positive shock in output tends to 
reduce government expenditure and increase net taxes in practically all cases under study. The 
strong positive reaction of inflation to public spending shocks can also be easily framed in the set-
ting of simple aggregate supply-aggregate demand models.  
 
4.2  Robustness checks and caveats 
 
Before concluding, we present various robustness checks that have been executed to ensure that the 
baseline results still hold when alternative specifications are taken into account.
22 
First, we account for the concern that the identified fiscal shocks might actually have been 
anticipated. Given that government expenditure or tax changes have considerable legislative lags 
and are widely publicized prior to their implementation, economic agents may adjust their behavior 
                                                 
21 In the following, we discuss further interesting impulse responses without presenting the respective charts, which are, 
however, available from the authors upon request. 
22 Detailed robustness check results, which are not explicitly shown in this section, are available from the 
authors upon request. Jesús Crespo Cuaresma, Markus Eller and Aaron Mehrotra 
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as soon as these changes are announced and not necessarily at the time they are implemented. Such 
a phenomenon may distort the impulse-responses shown in the previous section (for a technical un-
derpinning, see Canova, 2009).  
In order to check to what extent fiscal foresight may be an issue in our sample, we follow 
Perotti (2004) and assume that publicly available forecasts for fiscal and macroeconomic variables 
reflect government announcements of future expenditure and tax changes. We then check whether 
such forecasts are systematically correlated with our VAR-based innovations in order to reveal their 
predictability. Table 4 shows the replication of Perotti’s preferred specification, with the estimated 
reduced form residuals from equation (2) for government spending and net taxes being regressed on 
vintage projections of the growth rate of government consumption and GDP for the countries in our 
sample (taken from various issues of the OECD Economic Outlook). With the exception of the 
Czech Republic, where a robust correlation with GDP growth forecasts can be found for net taxes, 
we cannot confirm the predictability of VAR innovations in our setting.
23 This corroborates the 
findings of Perotti (2004) for five high income OECD countries.  
The lack of statistically significant fiscal foresight can be explained by the fact that eco-
nomic agents indeed respond when discretionary measures materialize and not when they are an-
nounced, as budgetary announcements are most likely not taken at face value due to their prelimi-
nary character. This view is also supported by Johnson et al. (2006), who found, using data from the 
U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey, that private consumption displayed large contemporaneous 
responses to income tax rebates and changes in social security taxes although both of them were 














                                                 
23 The significant correlation between government consumption forecasts and government spending innovations van-
ishes for Hungary and Poland when we use alternative specifications, i.e. when we replace government consumption 
forecasts with projections for the general government financial balance as a percentage of GDP or when we include – 
besides forecasts for the current year j – also forecasts for the year j+1.  
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Source: Authors' estimations using data from the OECD Economic Outlook, various issues since 1997/1 (earliest available forecasts 
for the four listed countries; these projections are not available for Slovenia, which has become an OECD member only in 2010). 
 
Note: Coefficients are estimated with OLS. p-values for the null hypothesis of a coefficient equal to zero are in parentheses. The 
asterisk ** indicates significance at the 5% level. All regressions contain a constant (not reported).  
 
The dependent variables are the estimated reduced form residuals from equation (2) for government purchases of goods and ser-
vices (panel A) and net taxes (panel B).  
 
GC and GDP represent the projected real annual growth rate of government consumption and GDP, respectively. "_1" and "_2" refer 
to the two most recently published forecasts: "_1" ("_2") indicates that for annual growth in a given year j, we use the projections 
published in December (June) of year j-1 for the first quarter, the projections published in June of year j (December of year j-1) for 








Table 4: Predictability of Fiscal News
A. Reduced form residuals for government purchases of goods & services
GC_1 GC_2 GDP_1 GDP_2 no. of obs. R²
Czech Rep. 0.002 -0.002 0.0008 -0.0006 49 0.04
(0.30) (0.26) (0.59) (0.74)
Hungary -0.004 0.008** 0.0004 -0.002 49 0.11
(0.15) (0.04) (0.92) (0.71)
Poland 0.000 0.002** -0.0006 0.0002 49 0.12
(0.97) (0.03) (0.38) (0.80)
Slovakia 0.0008 0.002 -0.0002 -0.0004 35 0.07
(0.51) (0.27) (0.82) (0.73)
B. Reduced form residuals for net taxes
GC_1 GC_2 GDP_1 GDP_2 no. of obs. R²
Czech Rep. -0.002 -0.0001 0.016** -0.013 49 0.16
(0.79) (0.98) (0.02) (0.14)
Hungary 0.002 -0.003 -0.006 0.007 49 0.01
(0.82) (0.78) (0.52) (0.66)
Poland 0.0007 0.002 -0.001 0.001 49 0.03
(0.73) (0.38) (0.55) (0.64)
Slovakia -0.002 0.0005 0.001 0.0005 35 0.08
(0.34) (0.86) (0.48) (0.85)Jesús Crespo Cuaresma, Markus Eller and Aaron Mehrotra 
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Second, we address the issue to what extent the responses of fiscal and macroeconomic variables in 
the CEE-5 are truly due to a fiscal shock in Germany or to a different common exogenous shock not 
incorporated in the empirical model (such as global business cycle or trade shocks). Estimates based 
on data from before the Great Recession indicate that these responses were at least partly driven by 
the observations corresponding to the recession year 2009.
24 Moreover, analogously to Kožluk and 
Mehrotra (2009), we include a world price for crude oil (average quarterly price for Brent oil in 
USD per barrel) as the eighth variable into the system, assuming that all the endogenous variables – 
including the foreign fiscal balance – respond within the same quarter to a shock in oil prices, while 
the oil price does not instantaneously react to any shock in the system.
25 The baseline results change 
only slightly: The mean responses are generally slightly smaller, and the positive cross-border fiscal 
multiplier in Poland becomes statistically insignificant. While the response of the German fiscal 
balance to domestic fiscal shocks partly vanishes – especially in the case of spending shocks – the 
oil price itself responds unexpectedly strongly to some of the fiscal shocks. This indicates that this 
specification is not able to fully capture a global (probably non-energy related) shock that has a 
common impact on the variables in our model. As an issue for future research, a global VAR 
(GVAR) approach à la Dées et al. (2007) might be a practicable approach to obtain more satisfac-
tory answers in this respect. 
Third, the baseline results are based on estimated structural VAR models whose restric-
tions are partly calibrated using elasticities imported from existing studies, which are justified in 
section 2.3.1 above. We re-estimated several models using restrictions with other plausible values 
for the implied elasticities of the domestic fiscal variables, based on upper and lower bounds of ex-
isting estimates. The results were left qualitatively unchanged. 
While the setting used in the model allows the specification of very rich dynamics in the 
variables composing the VAR, a few caveats related to our modeling strategy should be mentioned. 
As in the case of unrestricted linear VAR models, our structural VAR specification does not allow 
different responses to positive versus negative structural shocks. In principle, a model could be 
specified in which different parameters are active depending on the sign (and eventually the size) of 
                                                 
24 For instance in the case of Slovakia, when we use data only up to 2008Q2, a shock in net taxes has not a significant 
impact on the foreign fiscal balance and a foreign fiscal shock has not a significant impact on domestic public spending 
anymore. 
25 This specification delivers five overidentifying restrictions, whose validity was confirmed for Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Poland, while it was rejected for Slovakia (at the 1% level). For Slovenia we were not able to attain con-
vergence when estimating the structural form coefficients.  
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some structural shock. In our case, the complexity of such a specification for the limited amount of 
data available makes it impossible to include such nonlinearities in the model.  
Moreover, the difficulties in reaching convergence in the estimation of the structural form 
coefficients (see section 3.2) prevented various additional modifications, such as restricting the 
sample to the pre-crisis period (in this case we attained convergence for Slovakia only), or scaling 
domestic spending and net taxes to GDP (in this case we attained convergence for the Czech Re-
public only). Nevertheless, we feel that our model allows an examination of rich dynamics in re-
sponse to fiscal shocks, in contrast to smaller systems where the structural form estimation may 
have been an easier task. 
 
 
5  Conclusions and further research 
 
In this study we analyze the economic impact that an unexpected, discretionary change in fiscal 
policy both in the domestic economy and in an important trading partner country (Germany) has on 
five  Central  and  Eastern  European  economies  (CEE-5:  the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia) from the first quarter of 1995 to the fourth quarter of 2009. For this purpose, 
we develop an open economy structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model that incorporates both 
foreign and domestic fiscal shocks. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first SVAR 
models  that  explicitly  accounts  for  the  transmission  of  a  foreign  fiscal  shock  to  key  domestic 
macroeconomic variables in CEE. To identify our seven-variable SVAR model, we restrict the 
contemporaneous responses in the system; the restrictions are calibrated by referring to existing 
(closed economy) fiscal SVAR models and by importing available estimates for fiscal elasticities in 
the CEE-5. Our model is able to reassemble well-known episodes of fiscal policy action in the 
countries under investigation. 
We find that the fiscal policy stance in the CEE-5 is affected by fiscal policy changes in 
Germany. If Germany undertakes a fiscal expansion, all the CEE-5 will react with fiscal easing too 
– more on the public spending than on the revenue side. At the same time, in a few specifications, 
fiscal  shocks  in  the  CEE-5  have  an  impact  on  the  German  fiscal  balance  as  well.  There  are 
indications that common reactions to the recession in 2009 prompted responses in both ways.  
The  evidence  is  less  homgeneous  for  cross-country  fiscal  multipliers.  The  negative 
economic  transmission  of  a  fiscal  shock  in  Germany  to  the  Czech  Republic  and  Slovakia  is Jesús Crespo Cuaresma, Markus Eller and Aaron Mehrotra 
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apparently  due  to  a  stronger  weight  of  the  negative  interest  rate  channel  in  comparison  to  the 
potentially positive trade and exchange rate channels. In Poland and Hungary, in turn, the positive 
response of real GDP to a fiscal shock in Germany points to a more dominant role of the trade and 
exchange rate channels in these economies. There is also some evidence for an impact on the policy 
mix in Poland and Slovenia, where the short-term interest rate responds negatively to a foreign 
fiscal expansion. Not only the response to a foreign fiscal shock is heterogeneous, but also the 
response to a domestic fiscal shock. In particular, Keynesian responses can be found in Hungary 
and  Slovakia,  while  non-Keynesian  responses  are  present  in  the  Czech  Republic,  Poland  and 
Slovenia.  
This evidence implies that fiscal policy in an important foreign economic partner country 
is a matter of common concern, underlining the importance of formal and informal coordination 
within  the  EU.  However,  given  the  heterogeneity  in  the  domestic  responses,  “one-size-fits-all” 
policy  recommendations  would  be  too  simplistic  for  the  CEE-5.  To  learn  more  about  the 
distribution of the costs and benefits of fiscal shocks and to promote a better understanding of 
country-specific policy preferences, it would be useful to examine more closely the reasons for the 
heterogeneity across countries. In order to find out whether various country-specific characteristics 
explain cross-country differences in the impulse-responses in a statistically significant manner, it 
would be indispensable to expand the sample and include additional countries with satisfactory fis-
cal data (e.g. a panel consisting of OECD countries).
  
Potential nonlinear effects related to the interaction of budget deficits and the level of 
public debt may be a promising avenue explaining the differences in responses to fiscal shocks in 
the CEE-5. High levels of public debt coupled with high deficits, for instance, may be a trigger for 
non-Keynesian effects. A thorough analysis of such effects using nonlinear structures would be an 
important issue of further research. Moreover, a generalization of our proposed model in order to 
consider responses to different components of government spending and revenues could also shed 
light on the source of the cross-country differences found in this analysis.  
Finally, it should be noted that different identification and estimation methods from those 
used  in  this  study  could  have  been  used  to  assess  our  research  question.  In  particular,  sign 
restrictions have often been implemented to identify structural shocks in similar frameworks (for 
example  in  Dungey  and  Fry,  2009).  Notwithstanding  the  recent  criticism  of  this  identification 
method – particularly as regards the estimation and interpretation of impulse-response functions 
(see Fry and Pagan, 2011) – its application may prove fruitful in future research efforts. Caldara and 
Kamps (2008), for instance, showed that the effects of spending shocks do not really change across  
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different identification approaches, while the differences in the way tax shocks are identified is 
important.  Further  extensions  with  regard  to  the  estimation  method  could  be  Bayesian  vector 
autoregressions (BVAR), as in Afonso and Sousa (2009) or Kamal (2010), or structural factor-
augmented VAR (SFAVAR) models. These methods are quite data intensive and computationally 


























 Jesús Crespo Cuaresma, Markus Eller and Aaron Mehrotra 
 
The Economic transmission of fiscal policy  
shocks from Western to Eastern Europe 
 
 
  32 
References  
 
Afonso, A. and R. M. Sousa. 2009. The Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Policy. ECB Working 
Paper No. 991. September. 
Badarinza, C. 2008. Fiscal Policy Spillovers: Theory and Empirical Results for the EU. Master’s 
thesis. Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main. 
Beetsma, R., M. Giuliodori and F. Klaassen. 2006. Trade Spillovers of Fiscal Policy in the Euro-
pean Union: A Panel Analysis. In: Economic Policy 21(48). 639–680. 
Benčík, M. 2009. The Analysis of the Effects of Fiscal Policy on Business Cycle – A SVAR 
Application. NBS Working Paper 2/2009. Národná Banka Slovenska. 
Benkwitz, A., H. Lütkepohl and J. Wolters. 2001. Comparison of Bootstrap Confidence Intervals 
for Impulse Responses of German Monetary Systems. In: Macroeconomic Dynamics 5. 81–
100. 
Blanchard,  O.  and  R.  Perotti.  2002.  An  Empirical  Characterization  of  the  Dynamic  Effects  of 
Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on Output. In: Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 117(4). 1329–1368. 
Breitung, J., R. Brüggemann and H. Lütkepohl. 2004. Structural Vector Autoregressive Modeling 
and  Impulse  Responses.  In:  Lütkepohl,  H.  and  M.  Krätzig  (eds.).  Applied  Time  Series 
Econometrics. Cambridge. 159–196. 
Breuss, F. 2006. Monetäre Außenwirtschaft und Europäische Integration. Frankfurt am Main: 
Peter Lang Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften. 
Caldara, D. and C. Kamps. 2008. What are the Effects of Fiscal Policy Shocks? A VAR-based 
Comparative Analysis. ECB Working Paper No. 877. March 2008.  
Canova, F. 2009. Is there Fiscal Foresight? Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Barcelona. Mimeo. 
De Castro, F. and P. Hernández de Cos. 2008. The Economic Effects of Fiscal Policy: The Case of 
Spain. In: Journal of Macroeconomics 30. 1005–1028. 
Dées, S., F. di Mauro, M. H. Pesaran and L.V. Smith. 2007. Exploring the International Linkages of 
the Euro Area: A Global VAR Analysis. In: Journal of Applied Econometrics 22. 1–38. 
Devarajan, S., V. Swaroop and H. Zou. 1996. The Composition of Public Expenditure and Eco-
nomic Growth. In: Journal of Monetary Economics 37. 313–344. 
Dungey, M. and R. Fry. 2009. The Identification of Fiscal and Monetary Shocks in a Structural 
VAR. In: Economic Modelling 26. 1147–1160. 
Eller, M. 2009. Fiscal Position and Size of Automatic Stabilizers in the CESEE EU Member States 
– Implications for Discretionary Measures. In: Focus on European Economic Integration 
Q2/09. OeNB. 78–84. 
European Commission. 2004. Public Finances in EMU – 2004. European Economy No. 3. 
European Commission. 2009. Public Finances in EMU – 2009. European Economy No. 5. 
European Communities. 2006. Manual on Quarterly Non-Financial Accounts for General Govern-
ment. Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Luxembourg.  
BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 12/ 2011 
 
 
  33 
Eurostat. 2008. Quality Report on Quarterly Non-Financial Accounts for the General Government. 
Retrieved from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS 
/Annexes/gov_q_ggnfa_esms_an6.pdf on March 2, 2011. 
Fatás, A. and I. Mihov. 2001. The Effects of Fiscal Policy on Consumption and Employment: The-
ory and Evidence. CEPR Discussion Papers No. 2760. 
Fry, R.A. and A.R. Pagan. 2011. Sign Restrictions in Structural Vector Autoregressions: A Critical 
Review. In: Journal of Economic Literature. Forthcoming.  
Giordano, R., S. Momigliano, S. Neri and R. Perotti. 2007. The Effects of Fiscal Policy in Italy: 
Evidence from a VAR Model. In: European Journal of Political Economy 23. 707–733. 
Giudice, G., A. Turrini and J. in’t Veld. 2007. Non-Keynesian Fiscal Adjustments? A Close Look at 
Expansionary Fiscal Consolidations in the EU. In: Open Economies Review 18(5). 613–630. 
Horváth, Á., Z. Jakab, G. Kiss, and B. Párkányi. 2006. Myths and Maths: Macroeconomic Effects 
of  Fiscal  Adjustments  in  Hungary.  MNB  Occasional  Papers  2006/52.  Magyar  Nemzeti 
Bank. 
Johnson, D., J. Parker and N. Souleles. 2006. Household Expenditure and the Income Tax Rebates 
of 2001. In: American Economic Review 96(5). 1589–1610. 
Kamal, M. 2010. Empirical Investigation of Fiscal Policy Shocks in the U.K. Munich Personal 
RePEc Archive. MPRA Paper No. 26473. Munich University Library. 
Kandil, M. and H. Morsy. 2010. Fiscal Stimulus and Credibility in Emerging Countries. IMF Work-
ing Paper WP/10/123. May 2010. 
Kolasa,  M.  2009.  Structural  Heterogeneity  or  Asymmetric  Shocks?  Poland  and  the  Euro  Area 
through the Lens of a Two-country DSGE model. In: Economic Modelling 26(6). 1245–
1269. 
Kožluk, T. and A. Mehrotra. 2009. The Impact of Chinese Monetary Policy Shocks on East and 
South-East Asia. In: Economics of Transition 17(1). 121–145.  
Lendvai, J. 2007. The Impact of Fiscal Policy in Hungary. European Commission, Directorate Gen-
eral for Economic and Financial Affairs. Country Focus IV(11). November. 
Lütkepohl, H. and M. Krätzig. 2004. Applied Time Series Econometrics. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Mirdala, R. 2009. Effects of Fiscal Policy Shocks in the European Transition Economies. Munich 
Personal RePEc Archive. MPRA Paper No. 19481. Munich University Library. 
OECD. 2009. OECD Interim Economic Outlook. March. 
Perotti, R. 2004. Estimating the Effects of Fiscal Policy in OECD Countries. Working Paper No. 
276. IGIER – Universitá Bocconi.  
Ponomarenko, A. and S. A. Vlasov. 2010. Russian Fiscal Policy during the Financial Crisis. BOFIT 
Discussion Papers 12/2010. Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition. 
Rzońca, A. and P. Ciżkowicz. 2005. Non-Keynesian Effects of Fiscal Contraction in New Member 
States. ECB Working Papers No. 519. September. 
Spilimbergo, A., S. Symansky and M. Schindler. 2009. Fiscal Multipliers. IMF Staff Position Note 
SPN/09/11. Jesús Crespo Cuaresma, Markus Eller and Aaron Mehrotra 
 
The Economic transmission of fiscal policy  
shocks from Western to Eastern Europe 
 
 





Variables Description and Calculation Unit Treatment Source
Foreign fiscal balance f* Fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio in Germany, calculated as f*=(g*-t*)/y*; 
definitions for g*, t*, and y* follow those for g, t, and y below; the 











Government spending g Government purchases of goods and services = government 
consumption + government investment = compensation of public 
employees (ESA-code D.1) + intermediate consumption (ESA-code 


















Net taxes t Net taxes = government revenues - transfers = indirect taxes (ESA-
code D.2) + direct taxes (ESA-code D.5) + social security 
contributions (ESA-code D.611) - social benefits and social transfers 
in kind (ESA-code D.62 + D.6311 + D.63121 + D.63131) - subsidies 
























Exchange rate e Nominal effective exchange rate (41 trading partners), period-




Inflation rate π Year-on-year change of the nationally defined consumer price index 
(all-items HICP is only available starting with 1996)
% wiiw
Interest rate i Short-term interest rate, period-average, corresponding to the 3-
month interbank offered rate in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 






Table A.1: Description of Variables
Source: Compiled by authors. Earlier BOFIT Discussion Papers 





















No 1  Anatoly Peresetsky: Bank cost efficiency in Kazakhstan and Russia 
No 2  Laurent Weill: Do Islamic banks have greater market power? 
No 3  Zuzana Fungáčová, Laura Solanko and Laurent Weill: Market power in the Russian banking industry 
No 4  Allen N. Berger, Iftekhar Hasan and Mingming Zhou: The effects of focus versus diversification  
  on bank performance: Evidence from Chinese banks 
No 5  William Pyle and Laura Solanko: The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: A test of 
  Olson’s “encompassing organization” hypothesis  
No 6  Yu-Fu Chen, Michael Funke and Nicole Glanemann: Off-the-record target zones: Theory with an application to 
  Hong Kong's currency board  
No 7  Vladimir Sokolov: Bi-currency versus single-currency targeting: Lessons from the Russian experience 
No 8  Alexei Karas, William Pyle and Koen Schoors: The effect of deposit insurance on market discipline: 
  Evidence from a natural experiment on deposit flows 
No 9  Allen N. Berger, Iftekhar Hasan, Iikka Korhonen, Mingming Zhou: Does diversification increase or decrease 
  bank  risk and performance? Evidence on diversification and the risk-return tradeoff in banking 
No 10  Aaron Mehrotra and José R. Sánchez-Fung: China’s monetary policy and the exchange rate  
No 11  Michael Funke and Hao Yu: The emergence and spatial distribution of Chinese seaport cities 
No 12  Alexey A. Ponomarenko and Sergey A. Vlasov: Russian fiscal policy during the financial crisis 
No 13  Aaron Mehrotra and Alexey A. Ponomarenko: Wealth effects and Russian money demand    
No 14  Asel Isakova: Currency substitution in the economies of Central Asia: How much does it cost? 
No 15  Eric Girardin and Konstantin A. Kholodilin: How helpful are spatial effects in forecasting the growth of 
  Chinese provinces? 
No 16  Christophe J. Godlewski, Zuzana Fungáčová and Laurent Weill: Stock market reaction to debt financing 
  arrangements in Russia 
No 17  Zuzana Fungáčová, Laurent Weill , Mingming Zhou: Bank capital, liquidity creation and deposit insurance  
No 18  Tuuli Koivu: Monetary policy, asset prices and consumption in China 
No 19  Michael Funke and Michael Paetz: What can an open-economy DSGE model tell us about Hong Kong's 
  housing market?  
No 20  Pierre Pessarossi, Christophe J. Godlewski and Laurent Weill: Foreign bank lending and information 
  asymmetries in China 
No 1  Aaron Mehrotra and Jenni Pääkkönen: Comparing China's GDP statistics with coincident indicators  
No 2  Marco Lo Duca and Tuomas Peltonen: Macro-financial vulnerabilities and future financial stress -  Assessing 
  systemic risks and predicting systemic events 
No 3  Sabine Herrmann and Dubravko Mihaljek:  The determinants of cross-border bank flows to emerging  
  markets: New empirical evidence on the spread of financial crises 
No 4  Rajeev K. Goel and Aaron Mehrotra: Financial settlement modes and corruption: Evidence from developed 
  nations 
No 5  Aaron Mehrotra, Riikka Nuutilainen and Jenni Pääkkönen: Changing economic structures and impacts of 
  shocks - evidence from a DSGE model for China 
No 6  Christophe J. Godlewski, Rima Turk-Ariss and Laurent Weill Do markets perceive sukuk and conventional 
  bonds as different financing instruments?  
No 7  Petr Jakubik: Households’ response to economic crisis 
No 8  Wing Thye Woo: China's economic growth engine: The likely types of hardware failure, software failure and 
  power   supply failure 
No 9   Juan Carlos and Carmen Broto: Flexible inflation targets, forex interventions and exchange rate volatility in 
  emerging countries 
No 10  Andrei Yakovlev: State-business relations in Russia in the 2000s: From the capture model to a variety of 
  exchange models? 
No 11  Olena Havrylchyk: The effect of foreign bank presence on firm entry and exit  in transition economies 
No 12   Jesús Crespo Cuaresma, Markus Eller and Aaron Mehrotra: The Economic transmission of fiscal policy shocks 
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